('Constitution') contain no bill of rights.
1 Australia is the only western democracy without a federal bill of rights.
2 This has been a matter of great debate for some time, a debate recently 3 re-ignited by the adoption of legislative human rights charters in the State of Victoria 4 and the Australian Capital Territory. 5 These developments have led commentators to consider whether the federal government should follow suit and adopt either a legislative, or a constitutional, bill of rights. The contemporary relevance of this issue has been heightened with the recent election (November 2007) of the Rudd Labor federal government. The previous Howard Liberal/National coalition government was openly suspicious of, and hostile to, the introduction of a bill of rights instrument. 6 
A

Hollow Denials that there is a Problem
The debate regarding the need for a bill of rights necessitates an understanding of what human rights the people of Australia already enjoy. If sufficient protection can be found in existing sources, does Australia really need a federal bill of rights? Opponents of a bill of rights state that we have sufficient protection from arbitrary government intervention in our personal affairs and thus a bill of rights is unnecessary. 7 Such persons declare, 'our basic rights and freedoms in Australia [are] well protected …' 8 These commentators assert that 'here in Melbourne, Mildura, or Maryborough in [2008] , we're ok, we don't have the human rights abuses faced by people in other countries'. 9 However, empirical evidence indicates that the traditional reliance on the common law and responsible government as the ultimate guardians of human rights is no longer sufficient. 10 Australian society has recently experienced an erosion of civil liberties. Anti-terrorism laws, 11 for example, now authorise acts contrary to the fundamental civil rights 12 that underpin the legal and procedural limitations to the police force's general investigatory and detention powers. Most recently we have seen control orders being imposed 8 Faris, above n 7. on Jack Thomas 13 and David Hicks 14 under these anti-terrorism laws. The ability to impose such control orders provides a specific example of the tension between anti-terrorism laws and individual rights and liberties in Australia. 15 Further, despite the report of the government-appointed Security Legislation Review Committee that aspects of these anti-terrorism laws, in particular those relating to banned organisations and the offence of associating with a banned organisation, breached fundamental human rights, the former federal government refused to repeal or amend them. 16 Immigration laws provide a further contemporary example of the derogation from human rights protection. 17 Such laws authorise the mistreatment of asylum seekers in breach of international law 18 through, inter alia, arbitrary indefinite detention. The previous Liberal/National coalition government ignored reports by, among others, the United Nations Human Rights Commission and Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, that its detention regime breached international law. 19 The current Australian Minister of Immigration and Citizenship, Senator Chris Evans, has stated that 247 people have been identified as having been wrongly detained under immigration laws. 20 In recent times these detention powers were misused on at least two Australian residents. Cornelia Rau was wrongly detained as an illegal immigrant for almost a year when she was mistaken by immigration authorities for a German tourist. 21 Vivian Alvarez Solon, an Australian citizen, was wrongly detained and then deported to the Philippines, despite health concerns, because she appeared to be a Filipina. 22 It appears that the vulnerable in our society, whether mentally ill, 23 homeless, 24 
B
Current Purported Protections and their Inadequacy -Plan of the Article
What then are the sources of law that the opponents of a bill of rights believe sufficiently protect Australians against such abuses? Protection for human rights might be expected from various legal sources in Australia, including the common law, specific domestic legislation, international law, and State and federal constitutional law. Whilst this article is primarily concerned with constitutional law protections, this analysis is part of a broader debate and the article begins with a brief discussion of each of these sources. The common law and specific legislation are wanting in this regard, and the effect of international law is uncertain.
The article then turns to constitutional law. Given the paucity of explicit constitutional protections, the article goes on to pose a further question, namely whether the framework of the Constitution may provide implied rights that serve as a further source of constitutional protection. It will be seen, however, that the courts have generally taken a constrictive approach to these implied limitations and that the very existence of some of these implied constitutional rights is in doubt. These implied protections certainly do not provide an effective source of human rights protection.
In the course of this constitutional analysis it is suggested that an alternative source of rights is needed -a federal bill of rights. 
II SOURCES OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN AUSTRALIA -NON-CONSTITUTIONAL SOURCES
What are the sources of law that the opponents of a bill of rights believe sufficiently protect Australians against human rights abuses? There are a number, including the common law, specific domestic legislation, international law and constitutional law. Each of these sources of law has, however, important limitations.
A
Common Law
Common law protections are quite limited and generally are not in the form of express statements of rights. They rather involve protective presumptions utilised in statutory interpretation 35 or assumptions of liberties in areas where such liberties are not prohibited by law. 36 Obviously, these presumptions utilised in statutory interpretation are rebuttable and may be overridden by clear legislation. 37 Furthermore, in limited cases the common law recognises substantive rights, for example, the right to a fair trial. 38 However, even these 'rights' are subject to legislative abrogation. 39 For example, the right to a fair trial, as stated in Dietrich v R, 40 was partially legislatively reversed by the Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), section 360A.
B
Domestic Legislation
Further human rights protections can be found in specific pieces of domestic legislation. the scope of this article to discuss the appropriateness of the intervention. As is implicit in section 132(2) of the NTNER Act, the intervention is racially discriminatory. The legislation impacts only on Aboriginal communities and Aboriginal lands 46 and thus involves an unlawful 47 distinction on the basis of race. Thus, contemporary events suggest that existing legislative provisions are not sufficient to protect the rights of, particularly, politically marginalised parts of Australian society, such as Aboriginal Australians.
C
International Law
International law provides a further potential source of human rights protection in Australia. petition the United Nations' Human Rights Commission, alleging human rights abuses, the Commission lacks an effective enforcement mechanism. The enforcement of the Commission's decisions is left in the hands of the particular member state, which is often the offending entity. In this regard it is particularly relevant to note that the previous Liberal/National 51 coalition government consistently refused to address international findings of breaches of human rights. 52 This government merely rebuked the relevant committee for its findings against Australia and asserted that the United Nations was interfering in domestic affairs. 53 Thus, despite the individual petition mechanism of the Human Rights Commission, the Commission has not proved able to provide an effective international forum for the protection of human rights.
Moreover, international law is in itself a vulnerable source of rights. Customary international law can be overridden by express domestic legislation. While this results in Parliament being in breach of international law, the courts are bound to apply the infringing law. Thus in Polites v Commonwealth 54 the High Court was forced to uphold conscription legislation that extended to resident aliens, even though this was legislation contrary to customary international law. 55 Further, conventional international law, treaties and conventions, are not enforceable in Australia until formally incorporated into domestic law. For example, despite the Fraser 
Acquiring Property on Just Terms
Turning to the analysis of the existing constitutional protections, section 51(xxxi) provides for the right to have property acquired on just terms. More specifically, section 51(xxxi) provides that the Commonwealth has power to 'make laws … with respect to … [t]he acquisition of property on just terms from any State or person in respect of which the Parliament has power to make laws'. 57 At first glance, this does not look like a constitutional human rights protection. It seems designed to ensure that the Commonwealth enjoys the legislative authority to compulsorily acquire property, including State property. 58 However, section 51(xxxi) was designed to have a dual purpose.
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It was also intended to provide a constraint on the compulsory acquisition power and ensure that whenever the Commonwealth exercises the power, it must do so on just terms. 60 Thus the section was 'intended to recognise the principle of the immunity of private and provincial property from interference by the federal authority, except on fair and equitable terms'. 61 However, from the outset it must be noted that section 51(xxxi) does not guarantee that your home cannot be compulsorily acquired. It only prevents the power being exercised arbitrarily. 62 It merely provides that the compulsory acquisition must be on just terms; it must be fair, 63 balancing the community's interests against the interests of the person whose property is to be taken. 64 There are a number of flaws in section 51(xxxi) as a source of constitutional protection, flaws that should be addressed through reform. First, section 51(xxxi) applies only to the Commonwealth. There is no equivalent provision in the State Constitutions. Section 51(xxxi) does not apply to a compulsory acquisition by a State 65 unless the federal government has funded the compulsory acquisition. 66 It is also unclear whether section 51(xxxi) applies to the Territories, in particular the federal government's use of section 122 of the Constitution (the 'Territories' power). 67 As with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 68 the terms of any bill of rights instrument should extend to the State and Territory governments, not just the federal government.
Second, there is merit in including a provision similar to that found in section 25 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 that ensures that any expropriation of property must be under a law of general application. This would prevent the property rights of marginalised members of the community being targeted by the government through private Acts of Parliament. Historically, examples of such governmental actions can be found in the dissolution of the Adelaide Company of Jehovah's Witnesses 69 and the dissolution of the Builders Labourers Federation in 1986. 70 Third, and most importantly, any protection should extend to compulsory acquisitions as a matter of substance, not just form. There are a number of existing limitations to the operation of section 51(xxxi) which mean it will not always apply to what is in substance a compulsory acquisition. Section 51(xxxi) applies only if there is a compulsory acquisition. 71 It does not apply if the Commonwealth negotiates an agreement for the acquisition. 72 For section 51(xxxi) to apply, the Commonwealth must acquire a proprietary interest in the subject property, not merely constrain its use. 73 Similarly, the courts have asserted that section 51(xxxi) applies only to a law that results in an acquisition of property, as opposed to one that merely diminishes the content of a property right. 74 Section 51(xxxi) has also been held to be inapplicable to laws that make a 'genuine adjustment of competing claims, rights and obligations in the common interests between parties who stand in a particular relationship'. 75 Moreover, the courts have asserted that statutory rights can be acquired without compliance with section 51(xxxi). Effectively the courts have said that if a proprietary right was created by statute, then it can be reduced by statute. 76 These limitations have wrongly allowed form to prevail over what is in substance a compulsory acquisition.
Fourth, the question of the absoluteness of the protection then needs to be addressed. Under the current law in Australia, while generally the legislative powers specified in, inter alia, section 51 of the Constitution, are said to be subject to section 51(xxxi), 77 the High Court has held that in certain cases legislative powers 78 may be used to compulsorily acquire property other than on just terms. Is it appropriate for the courts to conclude that it is express or implied in a section of the Constitution that legislative powers are not subject to section 51(xxxi)?
Should there be an absolute freedom from compulsory acquisition? The Fifth Amendment of the United States' Bill of Rights provides a right not to be deprived of property without due process of law. As Dixon J noted in Grace Bros Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth 79 this provision appropriately has as its primary purpose the protection of the citizen, rather than extending an acquisition power to the government.
Could the absoluteness of the protection be abridged in times of national emergency?
80 Section 37 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 allows certain rights to be abridged in the case of a state of emergency. The Table of non-derogable rights included in section 37(5) does not include the protection of property rights under section 25, but rather is confined to rights such as the right to equality, right to human dignity and right to life. Further, section 25(2) allows for the expropriation of property for a 'public purpose or in the public interest'. However, the expropriation must not be arbitrary, it must be effected through a general law, and just compensation must be paid.
Alternatively, the right not to be deprived of property could be subject to a general limitation that it may be subject to reasonable laws. Alternatively, the focus could shift from a right not to be deprived of property, to a guarantee that the terms of any acquisition will be just, and that any consequent compensation will be fair. 81 Sections 25(2) and (3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 provide in detail for a right to compensation for an expropriation of property. This includes a statement that the 'amount of the compensation and the time and manner of payment must be just and equitable, reflecting an equitable balance between the public interest and the interests of those affected, having regard to all the circumstances …'. Section 25(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 then details factors relevant to the determination of a just payment, such as current use of the land, its market value, the extent of any state investment/subsidy and the purpose of the expropriation. The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 provides extremely useful guidelines for an Australian protection against the deprivation of property.
B
Trial by Jury
The right to trial by jury is supposedly protected by section 80 of the Constitution. The section provides in part that: 'The trial 82 on indictment of any offence against any law of the Commonwealth shall be by jury.' It will be seen that section 80 is subject to a number of major limitations that render it ineffective as a human rights protection.
The right to trial by our peers is part of the broader notion that individuals should not be subject to arbitrary detention. 83 The right to a jury trial is one of the pillars of our criminal justice system that sets our society apart from police states. Thus as Deane J declared in Kingswell v R: 84 The guarantee of s 80 of the Constitution was not the mere expression of some casual preference for one form of criminal trial. It reflected a deepseated conviction of free men and women about the way in which justice should be administered in criminal cases. That conviction finds a solid basis in an understanding of the history and functioning of the common law as a bulwark against the tyranny of arbitrary punishment.
Given the importance of trial by jury, these shortcomings in its protection should be addressed through reform. First, as with section 51(xxxi), section 80 is limited by its express terms so as to apply only to Commonwealth laws. 85 There is no equivalent provision in the State constitutions 86 and the applicability of section 80 to the Territories is uncertain. 87 Nevertheless, it would be desirable to extend any right to a jury trial to those charged under State and Territory law, not just those charged under federal law.
Second, and most importantly, section 80 has been interpreted as a meaningless tautology and needs to be rephrased so that it provides effective protection. Narrowly construed, section 80 states that 'trial by jury shall be by jury'. The reason for this tautology lies in the fact that the technical meaning of an indictable offence is one that is tried by judge and jury, while a summary offence is tried by judge alone. This tautology has allowed the Australian judiciary to conclude that section 80 requires that, if the subject offence is an indictable offence, there must be a jury trial, but that it does not compel the Commonwealth to ensure that serious offences are classified as indictable offences. 88 As long as the Commonwealth chooses to make a crime a summary offence, no matter how serious the offence nor how severe the consequent punishment, 89 there is no right to a jury trial. 90 Thus the reference to an indictable offence in section 80 needs to be replaced by a criterion that is tied to the seriousness of the offence. For example, section 11(f) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms provides a right to a jury trial where the 'maximum punishment for the offence is imprisonment for five years or a more severe punishment'. Under section 24(e) of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) the minimum period of imprisonment triggering the right to a jury trial is only three months. Setting a period of imprisonment as the keystone for the application of the protection is preferable to the use of the technical summary/indictable distinction in section 80. It is also preferable to any suggestion that the protection apply in 'serious criminal cases'. 91 The notion of 'serious' is too vague to provide the basis of such an important right.
Third, it needs to be considered whether the right to a jury trial should extend to courts martial. In accordance with the principle that it is for the Commonwealth to determine whether an offence is to be tried by jury, section 80 has been held not to extend to courts martial. 92 It is interesting that the right to a jury trial is often excluded from military tribunals, through the operation, for example, of sections 11(f) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and 24(e) of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ).
Related to this question is the issue of whether a right to a jury trial should also be applicable to civil cases. The United States' Bill of Rights recognises the right to a jury in both criminal and civil cases. Specifically, the Sixth Amendment provides for the right to a fair, 93 speedy, impartial, public trial by jury in criminal cases. A right to a jury trial is also recognised for civil cases 89 Even though the subject offence, Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 30K, carried a penalty of one year imprisonment, the legislation stated that it could be tried summarily. by the Seventh Amendment. However, as the right to personal liberty is clearly more important than property rights, there may be a case for limiting the right to a jury trial to criminal matters.
C
Freedom of Religion
Section 116 Constitution provides:
The commonwealth shall not make any law for establishing any religion, or for imposing any religious observance, or for prohibiting the free exercise of any religion, and no religious test shall be required as a qualification for any office or public trust under the Commonwealth.
Section 116 prohibits four distinct aspects of governmental involvement in religious matters:
• the establishment of any religion; • the imposition of any religious observance; • the prohibition of the free exercise of any religion; and • the use of religion as a qualification for public office
While section 116 has four heads, nearly all the key cases 94 have been concerned only with the third clause, the protection of the free exercise of any religion. As detailed below, section 116 is subject to major important limitations that, despite its seeming breadth, have rendered this so-called constitutional guarantee a 'paper tiger'. The paucity of protection afforded by section 116 is remarkable given that the freedom of conscience and religion is one of the most fundamental human rights. It is recognised in leading international instruments, such as Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) 103 between laws (i) prohibiting the doing of acts required by religion (which are prohibited) and (ii) requiring the doing of acts prohibited by religion (which are not prohibited) must be rejected. Under this view only positive acts required by a religion are protected and, it will be seen, then only if they are not contrary to the general community's interest. A religion-based pacifism 104 is consequently not protected. A prohibition against blood transfusions and a religious requirement to respect the Sabbath by, inter alia, not working on that day, provide further examples of religious requirements that are not protected. Taken to its extremes, the above distinction gives rise to absurd consequences. For example, a religion requiring human sacrifice would seemingly be protected by section 116 as human sacrifice is an act required by the religion. 105 For reasons such as this, the United States' courts, with respect to their equivalent provision, have long rejected this distinction.
Thus reform measures need to embrace language that makes it clear that the protection extends, not just to positive acts of worship, but also to the abstaining from certain acts. Article 18(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, for example, provides for the 'freedom of thought, conscience and religion' and states that this includes the freedom of a person to 'manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice and teaching'. Article 18(2) specifically provides that '[n]o one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice'. Thus the protection of 'observance' and the prohibition on coercing a person to act in a way contrary to religious beliefs could address these concerns. Such general protections might also be complemented by specific clauses. For example, while section 15 of the Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ) similarly protects the right to 'manifest' a person's religion in 'worship, observance, practice or teaching', section 11 includes a right to refuse to undergo any medical treatment. The latter is of course relevant to the refusal to undergo a blood transfusion or other medical procedure on religious grounds. 102 Constituted by only two members of the High Court, Griffith CJ and Barton J. 103 sacrifice cannot be protected. Similarly, a religious conviction that involves the abuse or degradation of animals or humans 113 cannot be protected. In recognition of the need for some legitimate limitations, even the United States Supreme Court has adopted a 'balancing' approach to its religious guarantees that will at times allow the public interest to override a specific group's religious beliefs. 114 Nevertheless the Australian High Court's suggestion that general community interests can prevail over minority rights is disturbing. Consider the rationale for introducing section 116 into the Constitution. Surely it was designed to protect those who otherwise lack the political or numerical influence to protect their rights. 118 Hence it is 'consistent with the maintenance of religious liberty for the State to restrain actions and courses of conduct which are inconsistent with the maintenance of civil government or prejudicial to the continued existence of the community'. 119 Thus, the continued existence of the State must necessarily prevail over the free exercise of religion. This point is particularly pertinent in the so-called 'Age of Terror'. However, extreme care is needed to ensure that underlying fears about terrorist attacks do not lead to discrimination against innocent persons.
113 Care needs to be taken in regard to claims of degradation. For example, protocols that could appear degradatory to women might be based on historical/cultural protectionary norms. 
The Victorian Charter of Rights and Responsibilities 2006
recognises the right to enjoy cultural practices, to exercise a religion and to speak a language: section 19. However, the rights stated in the Charter are subject to a general limitation: they may be subject to reasonable limits under the law having regard to all relevant factors: section 7(2). Similarly, section 2 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms recognises as a 'Fundamental freedom … freedom of conscience and religion' but also provides in section 1 that the freedom is subject 'to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society'.
120 Section 36(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 contains a similar provision, but also states in section 31(2) that the right to, inter alia, practise religion 'may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any provision of the Bill of Rights'. Article 18(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is a little more specific, only allowing legislative limitation of the freedom of religion to 'protect public safety, order, health, or moral or fundamental rights and freedoms of others'. Thus these human rights instruments provide useful guidance as to how to balance the private right to exercise religion with the private rights of other citizens and the maintenance of the broader society.
D
Freedom from Interstate Discrimination
Section 117 of the Constitution provides:
A subject of the Queen, resident in any State, shall not be subject in any other State to any disability or discrimination which would not be equally applicable to him if he were a subject of the Queen resident in such other State.
Broadly speaking, the impact of section 117 is that one State may not impose on the residents of another State some disability that is not imposed equally on residents of the first State. Section 117 continues to be a potentially important provision in contemporary Australia as it endeavours to achieve the equal treatment of the residents of different States. As Mason CJ stated in Street v Queensland Bar Association, 121 '[t]his section is one of the comparatively few provisions in the Constitution which was designed to enhance national unity and a real sense of national identity by eliminating disability or discrimination on account of residence in another State'. In a modern federation such as Australia the equal treatment of citizens continues to be an important human right.
Yet, despite the grand sentiments underlying section 117, it has proven to be largely ineffective in protecting even the right to equality, let alone the freedom of movement. Section 117's failure stems from two sources. First, the section has racist foundations, despite being inspired by Article IV of the United States Constitution of 1789.
122 Article IV provides: 'The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.'
123 During the drafting of section 117 the use of the United States' concepts of 'due process' and 'equal protection', which have provided great sources of judge-made constitutional law in the United States, were defeated because it was believed that they would invalidate laws based explicitly on racial discrimination. 124 The concern was that laws which today would universally be regarded as abhorrent due to their discrimination against Aboriginal, Islander and Asians persons, but which were at the time regarded by government entities as essential, might be invalidated by the clause. 125 For example, the State of Western Australia was adamant about the need to exclude Asian persons from its goldfields and would not support a clause that prevented it passing racially based laws. 126 How different the history of civil liberties in Australia might have been had the United States' concepts made it into the final text of the Commonwealth Constitution.
Second, the courts' approach in many section 117 cases has clearly been too technical. The leading cases on section 117 suggest once again that the courts have rendered a constitutional guarantee a matter of semantics that can be easily circumvented by clever legislatures. It will be seen that section 117 is subject to six possible limitations that should be addressed through reform.
See Street v Queensland Bar Association (1989) 168 CLR 461, 485 (Mason CJ).
123 See La Nauze, above n 95, 68. Note that the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (1982) contains two clauses that are relevant to the application of s 117. Section 6 specifies certain mobility rights. Section 6(2)(b) extends to every permanent resident of Canada the right 'to pursue the gaining of a livelihood in any province'. This protection is subject to 'any laws or practices of general application in force in a province other than those that discriminate among persons primarily on the basis of province of present or previous residence': s 6(3)(a). The right is also subject to 'any laws providing for reasonable residency requirements as a qualification for the receipt of publicly provided social services': s 6(3)(b). Under s 15(1) there is also a general right to equality under the law, without discrimination. 124 First, in contrast to the constitutional provisions discussed above, there is no case authority suggesting that section 117 applies to the Commonwealth. Section 117 is clearly aimed primarily at the States. 127 Like section 116, section 117 is contained in Chapter V of the Constitution, entitled 'The States'. In the case of section 117, however, its constitutional location actually reflects its application. While the Commonwealth is prevented from discriminating between the States in some respects by sections other than section 117, notably sections 51(ii), 92 and 99 of the Constitution, the prohibition in section 117 does not include the Commonwealth. This deficiency needs to be addressed.
Second, section 117 applies only if residence is the sole basis of the discrimination.
128 Thus, if the discrimination is on the basis of residence and domicile, 129 even though these often coincide, section 117 will not apply because it is legally possible that a person could be resident in Western Australia, but domiciled elsewhere. 130 Such reasoning is clearly absurdly technical, particularly given that the two prongs of the double-barrelled criterion of discrimination, namely, residence and domicile, are so closely related. A preferable approach can be found in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The mobility rights protected under section 6(2) are subject to 'any laws or practices of general application in force in a province other than those that discriminate among persons primarily on the basis of province of present or previous residence': section 6(3)(a). This clause would require the court to determine whether residency was the primary basis for discrimination. 133 the High Court also held that section 117 only prohibits discrimination on the basis of current residency. 134 Section 117 is impotent to prevent discrimination by one State on the basis of previous residence in another State. Again the Canadian Charter provides a useful reform model that could perhaps be augmented to ensure that the dominance of substance over form is assured. The mobility rights recognised under section 6(2) of the Charter are protected from 'any laws or practices … that discriminate among persons primarily on the basis of province of present or previous residence': section 6(3)(a).
Fifth, since only a 'subject of the Queen' can invoke section 117, its protection might not extend to persons who are not Australian citizens.
135
Brennan J also suggested in Street v Queensland Bar Association that it might protect only natural persons and thus might not extend to artificial persons, for example companies. 136 Sixth, section 117 is not absolute. The courts have recently asserted that section 117 does not apply to laws that discriminate on the basis of residence in a way that is 'appropriate and adapted (sometimes described as "proportional") to the attainment of a proper objective'. 137 The difficult question once again is to determine the absoluteness of the protection(s). Should it be absolute, as under the United States' Constitution, or subject to some limitation? The right to freedom of movement 138 and right to reside throughout the relevant state 139 are recognised in a number of bills of rights. However, commonly these rights are stated to be subject 'to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society'. 140 What limits could be justified? Can discrimination on the basis of residency ever be justified? Can a State legitimately restrict to its own residents the right of franchise for electing its legislature? 141 Is a resident of one State entitled to welfare benefits that another State provides exclusively to its residents?
142 Section 6(3)(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms recognises the legitimacy of laws that provide for 'reasonable residency requirements as a qualification for the receipt of publicly provided social services'. Can a State encourage local industry by adding a figure of, for example, 10% to the cost of out-of-State tenders for government contracts? In many cases, a State will be able to pursue a policy of protecting the legitimate interests of the State without using residence as the operative factor. For example, there would obviously be no constitutional objection to Queensland conditioning its bail laws, not on residence within the State, but on the likelihood of the accused fleeing the jurisdiction. 143 Similarly, competence to practise law might be tested in ways other than insisting on a period of residence. 144 In other cases, however, such as franchise in State elections and perhaps the provision of benefits or services paid for through State taxes, the criterion of residence may be defended as a reasonable requirement.
Perhaps, as Mason CJ suggests,
145 each of these difficult cases needs to be tested by asking whether the discrimination would 'detract from the concept of Australian nationhood or national unity which is the object of the section to ensure'. Alternatively, McHugh J asserts that the 'question is not whether a particular subject-matter serves the object of section 117; it is whether, by necessary implication, the matter is so exclusively the concern of the State and its people that an interstate resident is not entitled to equality of treatment in respect of it'. 146 Perhaps it is necessary to include in any bill of rights instrument some specific guidance as to the balance between State autonomy and discrimination on the basis of residence. Before concluding this discussion of the paucity of existing constitutional protections, it would be remiss not to consider whether the framework of the Constitution may provide implied rights that serve as a further source of constitutional protection.
IV IMPLIED CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
147
The process of recognising implied constitutional protections began with Murphy J in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Murphy J believed that certain implied rights were 'part of the fabric of the Constitution', 148 namely:
• the implied freedom of movement, speech and other communication;
149
• the implied freedom from slavery; 150 and • the implied freedom from arbitrary discrimination on the basis of sex.
151
It was not until the 1990s, however, that the notion of implied constitutional protections was adopted by a majority of High Court justices. In more recent times certain members of the Australian High Court have suggested that a number of implied guarantees can be extrapolated from the nature and scheme of the Constitution. Some of these implied guarantees include:
• the right to procedural fairness; • the right to proper administration of the judicial power; 154 and • the implied freedom of political communication. 155 As with the express constitutional guarantees, however, and exemplified in the context of the implied freedom of political communication, the Australian High Court has been particularly mindful of the need to interpret implied protections narrowly. Members of the High Court have asserted that the implied freedom of political communication:
• is to be narrowly construed and is confined to what is necessary to give effect to the terms and structure of the ) and Gummow J 167 rejected the existence of the alleged implied constitutional freedoms. In regard to the implied requirement of 'legal equality', these justices asserted that some provisions of the Constitution (sections 51(ii), 51(iii), 51(xix), 51 (xxvi), 88, 92, 99 and 117) contemplate 'legislative inequality'. 168 In regard to the implied right to freedom of movement and association, Brennan CJ asserted that no 'such right has hitherto been held to be implied in the Constitution and no textual or structural foundation for the implication has been demonstrated in this case'. 169 The judges denied that such a right was a 'corollary of that freedom of communication about government and political matters which is implied in the Constitution …' 170 Moreover, as noted above, Brennan CJ 171 and Dawson J 172 also held that section 122 (the 'Territories' power) extended to the Commonwealth an absolute legislative power with respect to the Territories that was not subject to any express or implied constitutional prohibition. Thus, if the alleged implied right to legal equality existed, the Ordinance, which 'treated Aboriginal children differently from other children' would nevertheless be validly enacted under section 122. 173 Toohey, Gummow and Gaudron JJ disagreed on this point, asserting that section 122 was not necessarily immune from express (s 116) or implied constitutional protections. 174 However, Toohey and Gummow JJ held that if section 122 was subject to the 164 (1997) 190 CLR 1, 46. Brennan CJ found it unnecessary to consider many of the grounds put forward by the plaintiffs as he believed the Ordinance (i) was not intended to inflict mental harm and (ii) was not intended to prohibit the free exercise of religion. This meant that the crux for him was whether s 122 was limited by these constitutional restrictions: 41. 165 . Dawson J asserted that the right to due process was procedural in nature and thus did not provide a substantive right or freedom: 69. 166 Ibid 142-4. 167 . 168 Ibid 45 (Brennan CJ), see also 64 (Dawson J), 155 (Gummow J). 169 Ibid 45. 170 Ibid 45 (Brennan CJ), see also 155 (Gummow J). 171 Ibid 41. Once there was a sufficient connection between the law and the Territories, the Territories power was said to be without limitation: 41. 172 Ibid 56, 68-70 and 73. 173 Ibid 42 (Brennan CJ). 174 Ibid 79, 85, 92-3 and 96 (Toohey J), 162 and 166-7 (Gummow J), 114-125 and 141 (Gaudron J).
alleged constitutional rights, the Ordinance had not breached them. 175 Only Gaudron J in her dissent stated a belief that the Ordinance breached the implied constitutional freedom of movement and association. 176 The Ordinance conferred powers which directly constrained the freedom of movement and association by, for example, requiring Aboriginal persons to remain on reserves and by removing Aboriginal children from their families and detaining them in Aboriginal institutions. 177 All indications suggest that this narrowing of any implied constitutional protections will continue. Recently retired Justice Callinan has criticised Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 178 not because of its narrowing of the implied constitutional protection, but for its very recognition of the implied protection. 179 Callinan J rejected the existence of the implied constitutional freedom of communication, adding that 'the authors of the Constitution were well aware of the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and most deliberately must have chosen not to incorporate such a provision in our Constitution'. 180 Not long before his appointment to the High Court, Heydon J extra-curially criticised Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation 181 and 'judicial activism' generally as the 'illegitimate' use of the judicial function to further 'some political, moral or social program'.
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Implied constitutional rights will certainly not constitute a set of rights obviating the need for a federal bill of rights. Moreover, the courts' attitude to the legal relevance of a breach of both express and implied constitutional provisions (ie the inability to seek damages) indicates that, even when breached, implied constitutional rights might not provide an adequate remedy in a given case. 188 The sovereignty of Indian Nations became entrenched in the United States case law as a result of a series of cases that have come to be known as the 'Marshall trilogy'. 189 According to the 'Marshall trilogy', these Indian Nations had to be left in the undisturbed possession of their lands, the right to which was only diminished to a limited extent by the new sovereign's right of pre-emption. 190 It was recognised that Indian tribes, as separate Nations, were entitled to govern themselves and enforce their own customary laws. This sovereignty allowed Indian Nations to regulate affairs within the scope of their territory, exercising authority over matters such as community membership, domestic relations between members, fish and game resources and taxation, 191 and enjoying sovereign immunity from suit.
V THE LACK OF SPECIFICALLY ABORIGINAL RIGHTS
192 Hence, the reference to 'Indians not taxed' relates to those Indian persons living in a self-governing Indian Nation that is not subject to federal tax. Thus the 14 th Amendment was transplanted into the Australian Commonwealth Constitution even though the sovereignty of the Aboriginal peoples was not recognised in Australia.
In 1967 section 127 was removed from the Constitution as a consequence of one of the few successful referenda on the amendment of the Constitution. Thus it was not until 1967 that the Aboriginal peoples of Australia were recognised as being Australian persons for the purposes of censuses. Section 25, however, was not repealed as a result of the 1967 referendum and still remains in this form in the Constitution.
Section 51(xxvi), known as the 'races' power, originally extended to the Commonwealth legislative authority over ' [t] he people of any race, other than the Aboriginal race in any state, for whom it is deemed necessary to make special laws…' Thus originally the federal Parliament had no specific power to pass laws in regard to the Aboriginal peoples of Australia. The Commonwealth legislative authority to pass laws dealing with Aboriginal persons, such as the Aboriginal Ordinance 1918 (Cth) considered above in Kruger v Commonwealth, 193 was based on the other non-race-specific sections of the Constitution. In this case the primary source of legislative power was section 122, the 'Territories' power. Section 51(xxvi) reflected the fact that, historically, Aboriginal affairs were regarded as a State matter. 212 in the manner described above. How disturbing the possibility is that section 51(xxvi) might be used to pass laws that impact negatively on a race is shown by the Solicitor-General's response to a question from Kirby J in Kartinyeri v Commonwealth. 213 When asked if section 51(xxvi) could be used to validly enact Nuremberg-style race laws or South African apartheid laws, the Solicitor-General unhesitatingly replied in the affirmative, adding that the section gives a power to pass what may be described as 'inherently a discriminatory law'. 214 The constitutional position of the Aboriginal peoples of Australia is abhorrent, both because of the express provisions of the Constitution and the absence in it of recognition and protection of Aboriginal rights. Any reform involving the adoption of a bill of rights instrument needs to address the historical discrimination against the Aboriginal peoples of Australia under the Constitution in a number of ways:
First, while the repugnant State legislation disenfranchising Aboriginal persons that provided section 25 with its foundations was ultimately repealed, in some cases as late as 1965, 215 it is nevertheless disturbing that section 25 remains in the Constitution and indirectly condones racist State laws. 216 As suggested by the Council for Aboriginal Reconciliation, 217 it should be removed from the Constitution.
Second, it must be made clear that section 51(xxvi) cannot be used to discriminate against the Aboriginal peoples of Australia. As noted earlier, the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) has failed to protect Aboriginal people from racially discriminatory legislation and policies. Equally, as Kruger v Commonwealth 218 indicates, constitutional implications do not provide a source of protection. Thus an express provision preventing discrimination on the basis of race is needed to adequately protect Aboriginal persons. To this end, the preamble to the Charter of Rights and Responsibilities 2006 (Vic) recognises that the Charter is founded on notions of 'equality and freedom' and states that 'human rights belong to all people without discrimination, and the diversity of the people of Victoria enhances our community'. Section 8(3) of the Victorian Charter also provides that 'Every person is equal before the law and is entitled to the equal protection of the law without discrimination and has the right to equal and effective protection against discrimination'. Sections 9(3) and (4) 
VI CONCLUSION
From the above analysis it will be apparent that the Commonwealth Constitution contains hollow avowals of human rights. It contains very few human rights provisions and, where the constitutional drafters did purport to protect a right, judicial interpretation has narrowed the right exceedingly. The four key so-called protections considered in this article particularly exemplify this proposition. As the above critical analysis shows, all four provisions have been emasculated by judicial interpretations, supported to some extent by poor constitutional drafting. It must be accepted that the narrow view of these sections is largely supported by the majority justices of, in particular, the High Court of Australia. These constitutional provisions, despite often being founded upon the United States' Constitution, do not provide an effective source of human rights protections in Australia. Equally, the courts will not use the Constitution as a source of implied constitutional rights. The paucity of rights in the Constitution, coupled with the inadequacy of any other sources of human rights in Australia, suggests that a new source of rights is needed -a federal bill of rights.
It must be recognised, however, that the analysis in this article is part of a broader debate as to whether Australia should adopt a federal bill of rights.
That the Constitution provides a weak source of human rights does not conclusively establish the need for a federal bill of rights. This article comprises just one component in the discussion of whether the people of Australia need a federal bill of rights. Thus, it is pertinent to conclude by briefly placing the article in the context of the arguments for and against such a bill of rights.
Until now the case against an Australian bill of rights has largely been based on the notion that a bill of rights will confer on the unelected judiciary legislative and executive powers, contrary to democratic principles. 222 longer supreme. 229 It is said that the power to declare laws incompatible with human rights will reflect individual judges' personal and political views and this will politicise the bench. 230 Implicit in this is the suggestion that the declaratory powers under the Charter are somehow more 'powerful' than the courts' existing powers to invalidate laws where these laws, for example, breach constitutional law. Respectfully, how such a declaratory power is going to politicise the bench is far from clear. Moreover, the British experience suggests that such a claim is without empirical foundation. 231 Ultimately, if a court declares an Act to breach a fundamental human right and the government responds to this through an amendment, how is that undemocratic? Is that not a positive feature of the bill of rights? 232 It has also been suggested that it is naive to believe that a bill of rights will eliminate human rights abuses through legislative and executive actions, as bills of rights have existed in the past in oppressive regimes. 233 Contemporary events have shown, however, that the United States' Bill of Rights of 1791 has provided effective protection against government abuse and, as stated above, the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK) was the impetus for the United Kingdom Parliament amending, inter alia, its anti-terrorist laws and securing the release of English Guantanamo Bay detainees. 234 Equally, in the absence of a federal bill of rights in Australia, as noted above, human rights abuses in Australia have been committed by the federal government.
In regard to the framework that such a federal bill of rights might take, should it be constitutional or legislative in nature? A constitutional model provides a more enduring source of protection of human rights as the Constitution cannot be readily amended. 235 On the other hand, constitutional models are criticised as being frozen in time and thus unable to adapt to a changing society. 236 They are seen as too inflexible because of the state's inability to readily amend their terms. 237 In this regard it is interesting to consider how current the protections under the United States' Bill of Rights are, despite their having been adopted in 1791. For the reasons delineated, legislative models are often seen as having a number of preferable features; in particular their ability to be amended more readily than a constitutional provision. 238 As noted above, constitutional models are also perceived as extending to the judiciary too much power, contrary to democratic principles. It has been suggested, however, that the impartial courts are better placed to protect the rights of the marginalised members of society as parliaments lack the time, expertise and political will to protect such members of society. 239 A further issue relating to the model of the relevant bill of rights is the question already raised above, namely whether the courts should have power to invalidate legislation that breaches the rights in question. As noted above, under a legislative bill of rights the courts are typically given the power to declare that legislation is contrary to the stated protections, but only the legislature can actually invalidate the laws. 240 This model has the benefit of avoiding the above-discussed perception of a judicial usurpation of Parliament's legislative power. It has been effective in the United Kingdom where Parliament has responded to judicial declarations by modifying the offending laws. 241 Only time will tell whether judicial 'shaming' of the Victorian Parliament will suffice and whether it would be preferable for the courts to have power to invalidate contrary legislation, as under the United States' Bill of Rights.
Thus this article must be seen in the broader context of the many entwined issues that need to be considered in the debate regarding the pros and cons of a federal bill of rights.
